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ABSTRACT
The introduction of efficiency 
improvements and enterprise 
bargaining into local authorities has 
been severely hampered by a failure 
to agree on a  method of measuring 
service productivity. This paper 
develops an outcomes m easure of 
productivity which, it argues, m eets 
both externally imposed cost- 
efficiency requirem ents and clients’ 
needs for service effectiveness in 
term s of quality and equity in 
delivery. Applications of th is m easure 
to library and stautory planning 
services are provided.
INTRODUCTION
The past two decades have been a period of unprecedented 
change in the Australian economy due to its rapid exposure to the 
forces, of international competition. Australian enterprises must 
now compete against a rising tide of imports, foreign investments 
and new entrants in order to maintain their market position. 
International competitiveness has become synonymous with 
improved efficiency and productivity, facilitated by the 
introduction of new technologies which have reduced costs and 
improved the quality of Australian products to world best 
practice standards. In order to achieve these improvements in 
productivity, manufacturers have had to convince workers and 
their union representatives to surrender a range of traditional 
work practices and wage structures to improve flexibility. In 
return, significant pay increases have been granted tied to 
measured improvements in enterprise-level productivity.
Inevitably this philosophy has permeated the public sector. 
Public service delivery units have been required to adopt concepts 
and processes originating in the private sector, including 
contestability, outsourcing, output measurement, focusing of 
services towards client or customer demand, delivering v a lu e  for 
money, devolution of authority to operational units (or agencies in 
public sector parlance), and the adoption of private sector 
management structures. There has been radical reform of the 
public sectors in most English-speaking countries throughout the 
1980s and 1990s with the broad aim of improving their efficiency 
of service delivery. This reform process has been a response to a 
number of factors including declining revenue stemming from tax 
reform and low inflation rates, ideological preferences towards 
small government and the need to reduce infrastructure costs to 
enhance the international competitiveness of local industry. In
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many countries, all three motives have operated simultaneously. 
The inevitable result has been that less resources are available to 
the public sector and service providers are under increased 
pressures to reduce their costs while improving the effectiveness 
of their delivery to client groups.
Public sector analysts have been critical of attempts to apply 
rigourous economic concepts such as productivity to that sector. 
Their arguments have focused on both the difficulties of 
measuring public service productivity and on the 
inappropriateness of using a physical output/input measure for 
complex service orientated activities (Weller et al., 1993: 2-4). 
Nevertheless, productivity improvements lie at the core of 
economic restructuring processes and strategies to improve 
productivity in the service sectors have been identified as 
essential to correcting the current slowing of growth rates in 
advanced economies (Harker, 1995: 3). There are both technical 
and political factors underlying the failure to agree on a method 
of measuring productivity in the public sector. The public sector 
delivers a diverse range of services, and most of these services are 
multifaceted containing quantity, quality and client target 
dimensions. In addition only a limited range of these services have 
a market value commensurate with private sector goods and 
services. These factors make it extremely difficult to measure 
productivity improvements in public services using private sector 
methodologies and hence it has been extremely problematic when 
measurements of public sector productivity have been suggested 
as the basis for enterprise bargaining agreements. These technical 
difficulties have meant that productivity measurement has 
become central to political debates between worker 
representatives and the Government as to the appropriateness 
and practicalities of implementing the public sector reform agenda 
and the merits of centralised versus agency-level wage 
determination.
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In this paper, the process of public sector reform in Australia 
is examined to determine whether an acceptable measure of 
productivity can be developed which meets the need to measure 
efficiency improvements in the public sector and might also be 
used as the basis of wage bargaining in public service delivery, 
using local government services as an example. Local government 
is a microcosm of the public sector both in the range of services 
for which it is responsible and in the degree of political pressures 
for reform to which it has been subjected.
In Australia, local government tends to be at the end of the tax 
gathering chain as local rates are only a small proportion of total 
tax payments. Consequently, organisational changes to meet 
demands for improved efficiency have often been undertaken as 
an internal response to specific financial difficulties. This has 
provided local service deliverers with the luxury of developing 
responses appropriate to their internal needs. Such response 
strategies are likely to become more common as local government 
services are affected by general expenditure cuts in their grant 
income in the future. On the other hand, local government has 
been radically affected by politically motivated reforms in the 
State of Victoria, similar to those implemented in Britain and 
New Zealand. These reforms have involved a major emphasis on 
competitive tendering of services to improve efficiency, which has 
resulted in organisational change strategies being forced on service 
deliverers by external authorities. Local governments provide a 
variety of services ranging from relatively unskilled manual 
'outdoor' work to professional services, such as planning and 
engineering. The spectrum of activities performed and the variety 
of pressures for reform experienced by this sector suggest that 
local government provides a useful context in which to examine 
the introduction of productivity concepts into the public sector.
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THE PUBLIC SECTOR REFORM PROCESS
In Australia, the public sector reform process has exhibited two 
phases. Under (Hawke and Keating) Labor Governments, 
demands from private sector firms facing increased international 
competition that the efficiency of public infrastructure services 
(ports, rail, electricity, telecommunications) be improved initiated 
the reform process. This was supplemented by a need to improve 
the effectiveness of community services as people placed public 
expenditures under more intense scrutiny. Labor's response was 
to progressively open service provision to competition and to 
introduce performance measures for service delivery against 
established standards or criteria (Beazley, 1995: 292-93).
Under Liberal Governments, the pace of this reform has 
accelerated with economic imperatives being supplemented by 
ideological factors favouring smaller government. The budgets for 
most public services have been significantly reduced forcing 
delivery agencies to focus on controlling costs, with inevitable job 
losses. Under the (Howard) Commonwealth Government's 
Workplace Relations Act, new more individualised work 
practices are to be introduced which will allow variations in pay 
across service delivery agencies. These changes are aimed at 
"breaking down the differences between the public and private 
sectors as a forerunner to increased competition and greater 
efficiency" (.Australian, 7 March 1997: 3). This approach is 
evident in the (Kennett) Victorian Government's changes to local 
government involving forced amalgamations, compulsory 
competitive tendering and mandated rate cuts (Hodgkinson and 
Castle, 1996: 30-31).
Implementation of these demands for cost cutting and 
increased competition were greatly facilitated by the managerial 
reforms of the 1990s. Public service agencies were required to be 
more accountable and to introduce private sector evaluation 
criteria. Organisational change usually involved a devolution of
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decision-making to the agency or unit level for a number of 
responsibilities which were once centrally-controlled, including 
financial management and staffing which have a significant 
impact on delivery costs. Thus as responsibilities at the 
operational level have expanded, there has been a parallel 
increase in the reporting requirements of these agencies back to 
their funding authorities, including an expansion of program 
evaluation mechanisms. Central authorities have required 
increased accountability of agencies through "a stronger focus on 
performance information in annual reports .... plus evaluations to 
test the relevance, efficiency and effectiveness of programs' 
(Beazley, 1995: 296).
The concept of accountability thus has been central to the 
implementation of these reforms. However, it has two, potentially 
conflicting, meanings when applied to public service delivery. 
Firstly, it relates to the demands of funding authorities and tax­
payers for financial prudence in the management of public funds 
— a cost efficiency concept. Secondly, it relates to requirements 
that the service fulfils its program objectives to its client base, a 
service effectiveness concept. Appropriate evaluation indicators 
which meet these accountability requirements thus need to both 
provide central authorities with the information required to 
monitor the financial performance of the unit and also provide 
work groups with the information needed to develop internal 
management strategies to meet and improve their program 
objectives (Bartos, 1995: 390). In the public sector, quality or 
client service requirements are often established as 'standards' of 
service as part of the centrally driven accountability requirements 
and integrated into the regular performance indicators of the 
agency (Dept, of Finance, 1995: 4). Parallel improvement targets 
are set at the decentralised agency or unit level and used to 
analyse processes and develop strategies to improve service 
delivery in order to meet these client requirements (ibid.: 24).
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While Government actions have tended to occupy most 
attention in analyses of this public sector reform process, the 
sector has also been affected by technological changes involving 
increased automation of services, ranging from power station 
operations to garbage collection, and the utilization of more 
sophisticated management information systems. Technological 
change has both exacerbated and facilitated the reform process. It 
has resulted in significant reductions in unskilled workers and 
middle managers while requiring an increased skilling and 
qualification of the remaining workforce. It has also generated the 
information systems needed to make quantative assessments of 
agency performance and to develop the indicators required to 
monitor the financial and program achievements.
Public service agencies are thus facing a number of external 
pressures which are forcing them to reassess the way in which 
they deliver their services. They are being called upon to take 
responsibility for achieving operational cost savings as well as for 
redesigning these activities to improve their capacity to meet 
client requirements. At the same time, they are under increased 
pressure to develop appropriate reporting mechanisms back to 
their funding authorities which measure their achievements in 
these areas. The public sector reform process thus emphasises 
cost efficiency and accountability as key concepts in measuring 
the productivity of the public sector.
THE MEANING OF PRODUCTIVITY
While the need to achieve productivity improvements have been 
driving this reform process, the intermingling of economic and 
political agendas and of cost constraint and service improvement 
objectives throughout much of the debate on productivity 
measurement in the public sector has resulted in confusion in the 
useage of the terms performance and productivity and of efficiency,
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effectiveness and quality o f service. An attempt to clarify the use of 
these terms is provided in this section.
Productivity is essentially a physical measure expressed as a 
ratio of outputs to inputs. In the private sector, this ratio can be 
readily converted into a value measure by converting outputs into 
revenue and inputs into labour and other costs. Thus 
improvements in productivity convert into improved profitability 
and generate a pool from which labour can be compensated for its 
contribution to this result in the form of pay rises. Pay increases 
linked to productivity improvements do not place pressure on the 
cost structure of firms and thus do not affect the international 
competitiveness of that economy.
As private sector philosophies and concepts have penetrated 
the public sector, service deliverers have been required to 
demonstrate improvements in productivity of a similar nature to 
that occurring elsewhere in the economy. However, these 
traditional productivity concepts do not readily translate into a 
public service milieu. Public service outputs are rarely sold for a 
commercial price, either being provided free and funded by 
general taxation revenues or provided at a highly subsidised 
charge. To further complicate any productivity calculation, public 
service agencies rarely produce a single unit of output but are 
rather responsible for a diverse range of services, often targeted 
towards a number of different client groups. A detailed 
discussion of these issues is provided in R. Green 1992(a) and 
1992(b).
A number of devices have been used to translate productivity 
concepts to the public sector. It is accepted that productivity can 
only be measured at an agency or work group level. This 
decentralised approach allows each agency's primary activity to 
be defined as units of output and to ensure a relatively 
homogeneous set of labour skills are included in the input factors. 
Even so, most public service work groups will require more than
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one activity to be included in this output as illustrated in the 
examples further in this paper.
Performance is usually measured by indicators which provide a 
separate quantative measure for each aspect of a unit's activities 
and has often been used as a loose measure of productivity. 
These are preferred by public service work groups and their union 
representatives as they can incorporate indicators for each of the 
multifaceted aspects of the unit's work program (Green, 1992(a): 
12). They are also very useful in the process of developing new 
strategies and monitoring the success of new work practices in the 
early stages of introducing a 'productivity culture' to the public 
sector (McMahon, undated: 2). Public sector performance 
indicators however, rarely translate into a financial pool from 
which to fund pay increases in a similar manner to the private 
sector. Thus the need to measure productivity again becomes 
important when productivity-based wage bargaining is mooted 
for public service delivery units.
Technical efficiency generally refers to increases in the 
output/input ratio and is thus consistent with productivity and 
cost-orientated concepts of accountability, which can be achieved 
by either expanding output or reducing inputs. Allocative efficiency 
refers to a reorientating of the unit's service mix to better meet the 
requirements of its clients. Allocative efficiency is thus related to 
social accountability or the ability of the organisation to meets the 
demands of the interests which it serves. Effectiveness, on the other 
hand, refers to improvements in the internal capacity of the unit 
to deliver services or in the quality and targeting of that service 
(Dalton and Dalton, 1988: 22-25). Effectiveness measures thus 
require the inclusion of quality factors, a concept well recognised 
in productivity analysis but which has been exceedingly difficult 
to measure (Payson, 1994: 1-32).
Few public service agencies object to the idea of improving 
their productivity in terms of the efficiency and effectiveness of
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service delivery, particularly if a pay rise is contingent upon 
demonstrating such improvements. However, the concept of 
productivity which is used to measure this improvement will 
differ depending on whether it is chosen by that work group as 
part of a voluntary internal organisational change process or 
whether it is required to meet the demands for efficiency 
improvements imposed by an authority external to the 
organisation. The concepts used to measure productivity will also 
tend to change when that organisation is placed under pressure to 
become more cost accountable and adopt a productivity rather 
than a traditonal service operational culture (Dalton and Dalton, 
1988: 21).
When organisations are given the freedom to determine their 
own productivity measures, they prefer to focus on those 
characteristics over which they have greatest control. In the local 
government context, this implies that more routine services such 
as waste collections, parks and gardens and road maintenance, 
will opt for particular technical efficiency measures consistent 
with their pre-existing culture. They would thus seek to have their 
operations evaluated in terms of maximizing the volume of output 
achieved from a given volume of resource inputs. Professional 
service delivery units such as libraries, development planners and 
community services, would generally prefer to use social 
effectiveness or quality of service measures (ibid.: 45-6).
The current public sector reform process challenges these 
traditional foci of service delivery by demanding that public 
services be evaluated against productivity measures which reflect 
the demands of the more competitive economic conditions and 
the new resource-constrained political environment. These 
pressures emphasise cost minimisation and smaller government. 
Consequently, both routine and professional services will be 
required to measure productivity in terms of minimizing the 
resource inputs used to achieve a given volume of output (ibid.).
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This places increased pressure on service delivery units to 
undertake organisational change involving changed work 
practices, the introduction of new technologies, reduced labour 
numbers, etc in order to meet these new demands to be cost 
accountable for the public revenues allocated to each service area 
(Schmertz, 1981: 163_65). The extent to which public service 
organisations actually change the nature of their service delivery 
will depend on the relative strengths of that organisation to 
maintain their traditional operational culture versus the degree of 
radical reform forced through the political agenda driving change 
towards a 'productivity culture'.
This struggle often revolves around the inclusion of a quality of 
service dimension in productivity measures. Simple cost 
minimization measures of productivity ignore social effectiveness 
factors (Armstrong, 1995: 311). Effectiveness includes quality of 
service factors (e.g. correctness of decisions) and equity factors to 
ensure services are delivered to the correct segments of the client 
group (Brudney and Morgan, 1988: 164-67). Social effectiveness 
or quality of service factors are important to both public service 
deliverers and the client groups to whom they are ultimately 
accountable (Belgrave, 1995: 310-11). The failure to include 
quality factors in service evaluations will reduce the motivation of 
workers to undertake the changes necessary to improve public 
sector efficiency if an essential element of their work process is 
ignored in calculating wage increases.
This debate is not readily solved with a centralised wage 
settlement process. Central funding authorities are primarily 
concerned with general cost savings strategies while agency 
specific social effectiveness issues are crucial in service 
improvement strategies acceptable to each operational unit's 
work forces. It is thus difficult to develop centralised 
productivity-based wage systems when conflicting concepts of 
productivity are held by each negotiating party. More scope exists
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to introduce productivity-based wage increases when negotiations 
are held at the decentralised agency level where some 
commonality of purpose exists among workers and management. 
However, such systems cannot be introduced without resolving 
the question of how productivity is to be measured and pay rises 
calculated in each service delivery context. Acceptable 
productivity measures for public services must incorporate both 
cost minimisation and effectiveness criteria, ie. it must measure 
agency outcomes (rather than output) to input ratios (Harker, 
1995: 12). This requirement has created major obstacles to 
introducing productivity-based wage bargaining in the public 
sector.
THE DEVELOPMENT OF OUTCOMES MEASURES OF 
PRODUCTIVITY
It is now accepted that measures of productivity should include 
quality factors and reflect the objectives of service agencies to be 
consistent with the overall trust of public sector reform in 
Australia, i.e., outcome measures need to reflect client 
expectations, the objectives of the program and professional 
standards of quality (Dept of Finance, 1995: 48). This then raises 
the question of whether measures of cost efficiency, quality and 
equity can be included in one productivity measure. Attempts to 
solve this dilemma initially involved the use of separate 
efficiency, quality and equity measures for each service area to be 
used in an overall program evaluation review. These were latter 
developed into indices where outcomes were measured by 
incorporating a number of cost and program objective indicators.1
1 For exam ple, a benchm ark value for resid ential building ap p rov als 
w as calcu lated  as: Number of decisions issued w ith in  ta rg e t 
response time (%) times Customer satisfaction rating (1_5) divided
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However, performance measures, despite their value in guiding 
and monitoring organisational change, are less useful as a means 
of calculating the capacity to pay wage increases. Where 
enterprise bargaining has been introduced into local government, 
the process has initially involved pay rises paid on an 
undertaking to commence organisational change and develop 
performance indicators. Productivity-based wage increases or the 
payment of productivity bonuses generally have been confined to 
labour-intensive, lower skilled operations, usually after these have 
been subjected to substantial job-shedding, conversion to business 
units and competitive tendering regimes. For example, Liverpool 
City Council's latest enterprise agreement contains provision to 
pay operational staff in the Liverpool City Works business unit 
three wage increases between 1995 and 1997, one of which 
involves a 3% rise dependant on their achieving a 10% reduction 
in road and building maintenance costs and that vehicle repairs 
occur at standards comparable with outside industry 
(Hodgkinson and Castle, 1996: 120).
Workers even in relatively routinized service units have 
expressed concern at the impact of these rigourous cost cutting 
measures of productivity on the quality of their work (Small, 
1995: 4). Conversely, a focus purely on social effectiveness or 
quality measures as preferred by professional service units may 
result in increasing unit costs, an unacceptable result within the 
current political environment (Dept of Finance, 1995: 11). 
Productivity measures which will be acceptable to all parties for 
use in enterprise bargaining negotiations thus need to include 
quality / service delivery indicators and cost efficiency measures.
by $ Unit costs. The index value with the best results in a pilot test 
was 1.871. This was used as a benchmark against which the 
performance of other municipalities could be measured (DHRD, 
1995: 8.7)
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Given public sector resource constraints and thus the inability to 
undertake all desirable improvements to an agency's activities, 
this implies that acceptable outcomes measures need to reflect 
that combination of unit cost savings and quality improvements 
most valued by the service's client base.
Performance indices previously used to guide the 
organisational change process can be converted into productivity 
measures by selecting output measures which are representative 
of the agreed objectives of the program or work unit and weighted 
by a quality coefficient reflecting the unit's actual achievement 
against a benchmark or target (Brudney & Morgan, 1988:163-6). 
This outcome value is then divided by an input value, such as 
number of labour units employed to develop a [labour] 
productivity measure. Movements in these quality adjusted 
productivity measures could then be used as the basis of pay 
increases.
However, it has been argued that work units evaluated by such 
measures will tend to focus on those services and client groups 
where they can improve delivery most expeditiously. Thus 
attempts to use productivity measures in evaluating work units 
and especially where they are used to determine pay rises could 
discriminate against service delivery to difficult clients where their 
service requirements would reduce the unit's outcome/input 
scores. Equity or distributional objectives can be included in 
productivity measures by weighting outcomes for each category of 
client by degree of difficulty. In the example footnoted above, the 
target completion time for development applications varied 
between 3 and 12 weeks depending on the type of application. 
Weights can be determined subjectively, based on observation 
and experience or through regression of successful outcomes 
against demographic characteristics (ibid.: 169-72).
Productivity measures of public service outcomes will thus 
need to include volume outputs, quality coefficients and equity
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weights and then divided by a resource base reflecting either 
simple labour inputs used to deliver that service or by an index 
comprising both labour and capital inputs. Input indices will 
become more important if significant technological changes are 
involved in the work practices needed to deliver the required 
productivity improvements.
Such productivity measures are in grave danger of becoming so 
complex that their usefulness as a meaningful measure of 
improvement in a work unit's performance is questionable. This 
problem can only be overcome by agreeing a very small number of 
activities as being core to that unit's objectives and as being 
representative of the full range of activities undertaken by that 
unit. Quality coefficients and equity weights are then developed 
for these activities. Performance indicators can be retained to 
monitor any other activities considered to be essential in 
evaluating that unit or agency.
However, the use of these productivity measures in enterprise 
bargaining negotiations still has to confront the issue of converting 
these physical measurements into monetary values. Conceptually, 
labour inputs are relatively easily expressed in dollar terms as 
wages costs. Depreciation values for capital items consumed 
during that period can also be calculated using normal accounting 
procedures. The question of whether material costs should be 
included can be negotiated, depending on whether they are a 
targeted element of improvement strategies for that unit. 
Consequently, per unit cost measures can be readily constructed 
for most public services.
Conversion of outcomes to monetary values is often 
impossible, except for cases subject to full user charges or 
contracting-out. Outcome improvements involving increased 
volumes of free services, subsidised service charges or improved 
service quality do not convert to dollar values, although they do 
represent an improvement in Value for money' to tax-payers.
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Increased outcome values of productivity can be measured and 
used to justify wage increases. However, the question of the 
source of funding to pay these increases still has to be addressed 
as discussed further below.
APPLICATION TO LOCAL GOVERNMENT SERVICES
The above discussion illustrates that conceptually it is possible to 
construct productivity measures which reflect service outcomes 
but still present these on a meaningful per unit cost basis. 
Productivity improvements can occur through reductions in unit 
costs either by reducing total resource inputs for a given volume of 
output (cost minisation), by increasing the volume of output for a 
given resource input (cost efficiency) or through improvements in 
the quality or social effectiveness of service delivery. Outcome 
measures of productivity thus meet the needs of the internal 
organisation to monitor the effectiveness of their change strategies 
and of the external authority for demonstrated accountability in 
the use of public funds. They also result in a measurement of 
productivity which is consistent with productivity based wage 
negotiations as currently used in the Australian industrial 
relations system.
Improvements in service outcomes under a regime of resource 
constraints imply a trade-off between costs and quality (Dept of 
Finance, 1995: 39). To illustrate this point, two examples of 
typical local government services are provided. The first example 
of library services shows how quality factors can be included to 
develop an outcomes measure of productivity. The issue of how 
trade-offs between cost and quality improvements can be 
accommodated within productivity measures is demonstrated in 
the example of the planning unit.
In terms familiar in modem vision statements, library services 
do not involve simply lending materials but rather lending
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materials drawn from a pool of resources which meets the needs 
of their users in a friendly and efficient manner. Strategies to 
improve library outcomes so defined could include (1) increasing 
the volume of materials lent, (2) restructuring the resource pool to 
better meet the needs of particular client groups (e.g. non-English 
speaking background, young people), (3) adding services for new 
client groups (e.g. the unemployed, illiterate), or (4) improving the 
attitudes of librarians towards users (Yorke, 1986: 279-80).
To determine the most appropriate strategy, library users 
should be consulted to determine which attribute they most value 
and prefer to see improved, assuming the available resource pool 
for that service area is fixed. Thus by directing organisational 
change strategies towards those aspects of service delivery most 
valued by users, productivity improvements will reflect both cost 
efficiency gains and social effectiveness or quality improvements. 
They will thus meet internal organisational preferences for quality 
of service improvements plus external pressures for accountability 
and cost minimisation.
A typical outcomes productivity ratio for library services 
could thus be:
Contacts [loans + inquiries(k') + participants(k")] x 1 + Client Satisfaction Ratio
FTE Staff
where inquiries could be weighted by k' to reflect the relative time 
intensity of inquiries versus loan processing determined on the 
basis of observation and experience (time monitoring). 
Participants can be divided into different population segments 
and weighted (k") to reflect the relative difficulty of servicing 
different groups. As library services are labour intensive and 
involve professionally trained workers with set hours of work, 
inputs can be represented simply by staff numbers measured as 
full time equivalents (FTE). The above formula will thus provide a 
labour productivity measure.
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For example, a library staff of 10 FTE originally have, after 
weighting, 5,000 contacts with the public per week with a 
satisfaction weighting of 80% (1.8). Their outcome value is 5,000 
x 1.8 = 9,000 and their labour productivity ratio is 9,000/10 = 
900. In the second period, following changed work practices, the 
same 10 FTE have 5,500 contacts per week with a satisfaction 
ratio of 85% (1.85). Their outcome value is now 10,175 and their 
labour productivity ratio is 1,017.5. Thus their productivity has 
increased by 13%, which could form the basis of a negotiated 
wage increase.
Libraries clearly also perform other, behind the scenes, 
activities such as reshelving, cataloguing, new materials ordering. 
However, in this example, the volume indicators have been chosen 
to reflect the 'client contact' role of libraries consistent with the 
client focus now prevalent in local government. Inefficiencies in 
these support functions would result in reduced capacity to 
deliver these contact services. Thus, to achieve a productivity 
improvement, strategies to improve support functions need to be 
developed as well as strategies for the functions specially 
targeted in the agreed measure.
The above example illustrates how changes in productivity can 
be measured as changes in a service unit's outcomes as a result of 
either changes in the volume or the quality indicator, resulting in a 
reduced per unit service costs. However, some productivity 
improvement strategies may involve trade-offs between volumes 
of output (e.g., increased throughput) and quality of service (e.g., 
increased accuracy) or between increasing outcomes or reducing 
inputs (e.g., labour).
Statutory planning units are responsible for processing 
development approvals, including informing applicants of 
requirements prior to submission of an application, and 
negotiating with objectors before submitting their recommendation 
to Council. In addition, this workgroup is responsible for
17
investigating complaints from the public regarding breaches of 
planning regulations. The types of applications dealt with can be 
weighted (k) to reflect their degree of difficulty. The number of 
recommendations made and complaints investigated with a time 
period form the volume indicator. Speed of processing has often 
been suggested as an output indicator for this service area, as 
discussed in the footnoted example above. However, slow 
processing and the need to defend appeals due to poorly 
prepared responses will result in a lower number of completed 
recommendations and thus these factors will appear indirectly in 
the suggested volum e indicator.
The correct recommendation for a development application is 
not necessarily approval. Thus a quality indicator needs to be 
included which ensures that recommendations are consistent with 
Council's existing strategic objectives in this area. A quality 
indicator reflecting the percentage of recommendations from the 
workgroup accepted by Council is suggested, rather than a client 
satisfaction rating, in this example. Ideally, Council should reflect 
community opinions on municipal development matters.
A possible labour productivity measure is:
Recommendations(k) + Complaints x %Recommendations Accepted
FTE Staff
For example, 12 planners may be able to complete 150 
development applications and complaints per month with an 
acceptance rate of 50%. An improvement can be achieved by 
either increasing the number of applications processed or 
improving the acceptance rate. With no change in work practices 
or inputs, the same planners could process 125 applications with 
an acceptance ratio of 60%. Both these scenarios would represent 
the same quality adjusted outcome of 75. The strategy chosen will 
depend on the priorities for this service. Each would reflect a 
labour productivity level of 6.25.
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Productivity could be improved by either increasing 
throughput ie. by processing 180 applications while retaining the 
50% acceptance rate, or by increasing quality ie. by still 
processing 150 applications per month but now achieving a 60% 
acceptance rate. In both cases, the new outcome value would be 
90 and labour productivity would be 7.5, an improvement of 
20%. However, the same productivity improvement could be 
achieved by maintaining the outcome value at 75 but by reducing 
staff numbers to 10. All three strategies produce the same per unit 
cost reduction. The chosen strategy will depend on the relative 
value placed on speedier processing versus improved accuracy 
(and thus being less vulnerable to rejection by Councillors) versus 
the pressures for cost savings by external forces due to financial 
constraints.
The above examples demonstrate how changes in labour 
productivity for service units can be measured and used as the 
basis of wage negotiations. A pool of funds generated by these 
productivity improvements needs to be identified. This will 
include actual per unit cost savings due to reduced resource usage 
and increased fees and charges obtained from the increased 
output where applicable. However, as argued above, many of the 
productivity gains will flow to the client base free of charge as 
increased output or quality of service without a commensurate 
increase in costs. These public gains can be measured by the 
suggested productivity measures and used to justify inclusion of 
increased rate and grant incomes obtained from the municipality's 
growing population and business base into the wage negotiation 
pool (Hodgkinson and Castle, 1996: 111). Municipalities which 
do not have a growing population or economic base must either 
use these measures to negotiate a rate increase in return for 
improved services or accept that productivity increases must 
necessitate a constant outcome to be achieved from reduced 
inputs, and hence cost efficiency savings.
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Once a gainsharing pool is identified, it is incorrect to assume 
that the entire pool can be used to fund wage increases. Any 
improvement in productivity will be the result of the combined 
contribution of labour, the use of new equipment and technologies 
and better management practices. Thus the share of the pool used 
for wage increases will become a major aspect of enterprise 
bargaining wage negotiations, based on the nature of the 
improvement strategies developed throughout the organisation, fri 
the few examples where this type of negotiation has occurred in 
Australian local government to date, a convention of sharing the 
pool, one-third to fund wage increases, one-third to fund new 
equipment purchases and one-third to cover corporate overheads 
has emerged (ibid.: 109).
CONCLUSION
The above discussion provides an overview of how the use of 
productivity concepts has developed in the Australian public 
sector. Local government delivery units, as with other public 
service providers, have been suspicious of using rigourous 
productivity measurements, more due to a concern that it would 
focus their activities simply on cost cutting strategies at the 
expense of quality factors rather than a rejection of the need to 
improve efficiency itself. This concern is reinforced by the 
increasing emphasis on expenditure cuts by their funding 
authorities and the introduction of radical reforms such as 
compulsory competitive tendering in some jurisdictions.
A method of measuring public service productivity which 
includes several quality dimensions is suggested. This method 
both meets the demands of funding authorities for greater 
accountability and cost efficiency in the use of public funds and 
provides work groups with a means of monitoring their internal 
strategies which includes the main variables agreed with their
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client groups as being essential to improve service delivery. 
Further, it provides a method of measuring productivity which is 
consistent with the introduction of productivity-based wage 
bargaining into local government services on the same basis as 
currently occurs in private sector firms.
An increased focus on decentralised wage bargaining, 
increased competition and improved efficiency in public service 
delivery and productivity measurement can be expected as the 
Australian Government's new Workplace Relations Act takes 
effect. The use of quality enhanced outcomes measures of 
productivity as suggested here offers public service agencies the 
opportunity to conform to these requirements while ensuring the 
quality of their services continues to meet client needs and 
professional standards.
Local government service delivery units have an advantage 
over other public sectors in that a significant proportion of their 
income is not dependant on tax revenues allocated by external 
authorities. This provides them with the feasibility to develop 
organisational change strategies suitable for local requirements. 
The concept of a gainsharing pool from which to fund wage 
increases offers an alternative mechanism to full user charges and 
compulsory competitive tendering regimes which represent the 
more obvious means of introducing productivity-wage bargaining 
into local government.
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